The Sudan Edition

Colin here. Ukraine and the Middle East have predictably dominated cable news and newspaper columns. However, another conflict looms in Africa, and threatens to unleash more instability in several ways. The Economist has described Sudan as a "chaos engine." An estimated 150,000 people have been killed since fighting began in April 2023, and many complicated factors are at play: a bloody civil war resulting in forced migration that stresses already fragile borders, severe famine, the battle for global ports, and yet another proxy war involving superpowers across the Middle East and up to Russia.

According to the Economist: 

Sudan's size and location make it an engine of chaos beyond its borders. Middle Eastern states and Russia are sponsoring the belligerents with impunity. The West is disengaged; the UN is paralysed. The violence will destabilise neighbours and trigger refugee flows to Europe. Sudan has some 800km of coastline on the Red Sea, so its implosion threatens the Suez Canal, a key artery of global trade.

Why is this interesting? 

Central to the issue is Sudan's location. The ravenous proxy interests stem from several factors, but its highly strategic position on the Red Sea is a significant one. Some players are interested in ports and protecting the Suez, others in minerals. In the case of the UAE, in addition to these interests, the country is concerned about militant Islam metastasizing on its doorstep. The UAE is currently supplying weapons and drone technology to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Iran and Egypt arm the other side, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

“Russia,” writes the Economist, “has played both sides and deployed Wagner mercenaries. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are competing for influence, too. Each of these actors has narrow goals, from securing food supplies to grabbing gold.”

This isn’t all only a clash of interests. There are significant geopolitical implications. Sudan borders seven states, none of which are particularly stable at the moment, including Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya. The refugee flow will extend to Europe, following similar instability in Syria and Libya. It already has: An estimated 60% of people in camps in Calais, on the south side of the English Channel, are Sudanese.

The diplomatic circuits are currently overwhelmed with two large, spiraling conflicts. But no one seems to be paying sufficient attention to a very severe patient in the ER triage. This lack of diplomatic engagement on Sudan suggests that the crisis will fracture into shards of glass, causing much more damage in the near term. (CJN)